International Yeats Studies
Volume 6

Issue 1

Article 5

January 2022

The Falconer is Dead: Reassessing Representations of Eternal
Recurrence
Matthew Fogarty
University College Dublin

Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/iys

Recommended Citation
Fogarty, Matthew (2022) "The Falconer is Dead: Reassessing Representations of Eternal Recurrence,"
International Yeats Studies: Vol. 6: Iss. 1, Article 5.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.34068/IYS.6.1.5
Available at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/iys/vol6/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in
International Yeats Studies by an authorized editor of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact
kokeefe@clemson.edu.

The Falconer is Dead:

Reassessing Representations of
Eternal Recurrence
Matthew Fogarty

I

n a letter addressed to Lady Gregory on December 26, 1902, William Butler
Yeats first acknowledged the onset of what would become a lifelong fascination
with Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy: “Dear Friend,” he confesses:
I have written to you little and badly of late I am afraid for the truth is you
have a rival in Nietzsche, the strong enchanter. I have read him so much that
I have made my eyes bad again. They were getting well it seemed. Nietzsche
completes Blake & has the same roots—I have not read anything with so much
excitement, since I got to love Morris’s stories which have the same curious
astringent joy (CL3 284)

Less than three months later, Yeats expressed comparable sentiments to the
New York lawyer, John Quinn, who had recently gifted him all of the available
English translations of Nietzsche’s books:
I do not know how I can thank you too much for the three volumes on
Nietzsche. I had never read him before, but find that I had come to the same
conclusions on several cardinal matters. He is exaggerated and violent but has
helped me very greatly to build up in my mind an imagination of the heroic
life. His books have come to me at exactly the right moment, for I have planned
out a series of plays which are all intended to be an expression of that life which
seem[s] to me the kind of proud hard gift giving joyousness (CL3 313)1

The magnitude of Nietzsche’s influence on Yeats has been well documented.
However, those who have examined the specific nature and extent of this
influence often note that Nietzsche’s writing afforded Yeats a certain validation
for values and ideas to which he already subscribed. As Otto Bohlmann
succinctly puts it, Nietzsche provided “substantiation and a stable base for
ideas Yeats might have felt unsure of.”2 This is not to denigrate in any way the
scope of Nietzsche’s importance to Yeats. Indeed, Conor Cruise O’Brien has
even gone so far as to suggest that Yeats “might never have developed into a
great poet without Nietzschean permissions.”3 But the complexity surrounding
the matter of Yeats and Nietzsche’s intertextual relationship serves as a timely
56
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reminder of the fraught theoretical terrain that invariably surrounds the
question of authorial influence.
With this complexity in mind, this essay revisits the function that eternal
recurrence performs in Yeats’s middle-period occultism and re-evaluates its
compatibility with the Nietzschean mode of eternal recurrence with which it
has traditionally been aligned. It should be noted that there are representations
of eternal recurrence in Yeats’s later works that endorse the life-affirming
potential that is in many ways the quintessential hallmark of Nietzsche’s
philosophy. In “A Dialogue of Self and Soul,” for example, the speaker strikes
a defiant and affirmative note: “I am content to live it all again / And yet again
if it be life to pitch / Into the frogspawn of a blind man’s ditch” (VP 479: 57–
59). Likewise, in “Lapis Lazuli,” there is a certain tragic joy to be discerned
from the speaker’s contention that “All things fall and are built again / And
those that build them again are gay” (VP 566: 35–36). However, the cyclical
historical model that Yeats presents in A Vision relies upon a historiological
construct that is far more deterministic than the sentiments expressed in
these later works. Over the past fifty years, those who have explored how this
historical model manifests in Yeats’s literary work have repeatedly turned to
“The Second Coming.”4 Indeed, John Harrison has rightly pointed out that
Yeats’s “cyclical view of history” is not strictly compatible with Nietzsche’s lifeaffirming antecedent.5 However, I would argue that Harrison’s distinction does
not go far enough. Focusing on A Vision and “The Second Coming,” this essay
demonstrates that Yeats’s historical metanarrative and the occult principles that
bolster it are fundamentally incompatible with Nietzsche’s philosophical values.
The theory of eternal recurrence is arguably the most elusive of the many
elusive ideas that feature in Nietzsche’s philosophy. In its most traditional
form, the theory proposes that, “whatever in fact happens, has happened
infinitely many times and will re-happen an infinity of times, exactly in the
same way in which it happens now.”6 Its origins can be traced to pre-Socratic
Greek philosophy, Buddhism, and Middle Eastern pagan religions.7 As a
non-theistic cosmological hypothesis, it requires neither a beginning nor an
end; or, to put it in Aristotelian terms, a hypothesis which requires neither a
prime mover nor a final telos. With respect to Nietzsche’s philosophy, there
are passages in the Nachlass—the posthumously published notes he compiled
between 1883 and 1888—that contemplate this theory’s potential to function
as a viable cosmological hypothesis. But these reflections are tempered by the
persistent sense that Nietzsche identified a hitherto unknown and incredibly
powerful axiological potential in all of this.8 Indeed, Alexander Nehamas has
observed that one must at least attempt to demonstrate that such a hypothesis
might be true if it is to be regarded as a genuine philosophical proposition,
and Nietzsche never does so in his published work. Turning to Thus Spake
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Zarathustra (1883–1885), Nehamas further notes that Nietzsche’s prophetic
title character never actually suggests that this theory might function as a
viable cosmological hypothesis.9 In the passage where eternal recurrence is
most explicitly discussed, it is, in fact, the surrounding animals who regurgitate
what they understand Zarathustra to have taught:
Everything goes, everything comes back; eternally rolls the wheel of being.
Everything dies, everything blossoms again; eternally runs the year of being.
Everything breaks, everything is joined anew; eternally the same house of
being is built. Everything parts, everything greets every other thing again;
eternally the ring of being remains faithful to itself.10

Considered in the broader context of Nietzsche’s philosophy, these animals
appear the embodiment of the “Nietzschean Herd,” both in appearance and in
their pliant acceptance of a cosmological hypothesis that Zarathustra promptly
dismisses as “a hurdy gurdy song.”11
The only other passage in Nietzsche’s published work that discusses
the theory of eternal recurrence in any detail is imbued with comparable
ambiguity. In this instance, Ivan Soll observes that “the entire question of its
veracity is neatly side-stepped by presenting it not as a truth but as a thought
experiment.”12 Published in The Gay Science (1882), this passage begins with an
all-important question:
What if some day or night a demon were to [. . .] say to you: “This life as you
now live it and have lived it you will have to live once again and innumerable
times again; and [. . .] all in the same succession and sequence.” Would you
not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who
spoke thus?13

The ambiguity generated by this non-committal prompt is compounded by
the question that immediately succeeds it: “Or have you once experienced a
tremendous moment when you would have answered him: ‘You are a god and
never have I heard anything more divine.’”14 Although a statement then follows,
it incorporates yet another question: “If this thought gained power over you,
as you are it would transform and possibly crush you; the question in each and
every thing, ‘Do you desire this again and innumerable times again?’ would lie
on your actions as the greatest weight!”15 Indeed, it concludes by posing one
final question to the reader: “Or how well disposed would you have to become
to yourself and to life to long for nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal
confirmation and seal?”16 Much like the prophetic Zarathustra, then, Nietzsche’s
demon narrator never proposes that the theory of eternal recurrence might
operate as a viable cosmological hypothesis. For these reasons, Nietzschean
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scholars in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries almost univocally
propose that Nietzsche reformulates the cosmological iteration of eternal
recurrence to function as an axiological imperative: If you had to live the same
life over and over again, would you be happy to make the same choices, or to
adhere to the same value systems that underpin these choices?
This understanding of Nietzschean eternal recurrence can be traced
to concerted post-war efforts to reclaim his philosophy from the taint of his
posthumous association with Nazism.17 It was first advanced by Georges Bataille
in Sur Nietzsche (1945):
I think the idea of eternal return should be reversed. It’s not a promise of
infinite and lacerating repetitions: It’s what makes moments caught up in the
immanence of return suddenly appear as ends. In every system, don’t forget,
these moments are viewed and given as means: Every moral system proclaims
that “each moment of life ought to be motivated.” Return unmotivates the
moment and frees life of ends—thus first of all destroys it.18

The emphasis Bataille places on these ethical dimensions laid much of the
intellectual groundwork for Gilles Deleuze’s 1962 contention that Nietzsche’s
eternal recurrence establishes an ethical principle as rigorous as Immanuel Kant’s
categorical imperative.19 Deleuze argues that, “as an ethical thought, the eternal
return is the new formulation of the practical synthesis: whatever you will, will
it in such a way that you also will its eternal return.”20 However, this reading
of Nietzschean eternal recurrence has largely been ignored by those who have
written about the potential correlations between this aspect of his philosophy
and Yeats’s occult speculation. For example, David Thatcher proposes that Yeats’s
interest in eternal recurrence was magnified by “Nietzsche’s reformulation of it
and from the attitude he adopted.”21 Likewise, Erich Heller argues that Yeats’s
A Vision “owes something to Nietzsche’s vision of [. . .] Eternal Recurrence.”22
Frances Nesbitt Oppel suggests that, as Yeats “charts his own system” in A
Vision, he tries “to follow Nietzsche into the paradox of Eternal Return, which
demolishes sequential or linear time altogether.”23 Patrick Bridgewater claims
that it was “Eternal Recurrence, as annunciated in Thus Spake Zarathustra, that
caught and held Yeats’s attention.”24 For his part, Otto Bohlmann turns to The
Gay Science to provide evidence of the supposed affinity between Nietzsche’s
and Yeats’s engagement with the theory of eternal recurrence. He claims that
Nietzsche “speaks of a demon who whispers the prophecy that your life as you
lived it ‘will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence [. . .]
The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and
you with it, speck of dust!’”25 Although Nietzsche does use the term “prophecy”
once when referring to theory of eternal recurrence in the Nachlass,26 it appears
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somewhat dubious to reformulate this passage’s opening question as a statement
and designate it a “prophecy.” In doing so, Bohlmann jettisons the critical
ambiguity generated by the demon narrator’s initial utterance. It is, perhaps,
understandable that Thatcher and Bridgewater do not consider the “thought
experiment” argument. Both of their studies were published before Soll’s
1973 re-evaluation of Nietzschean recurrence. It is more difficult to account
for Bohlmann’s and Heller’s reluctance to acknowledge these developments in
Nietzschean studies, as their respective works were published in 1982 and 1990.
There is no question that Yeats identified a certain philosophical justification for
his occult speculation within the depths of Nietzsche’s philosophy. It is deeply
problematic, however, to insinuate that Yeats’s justification is well founded in
Nietzsche’s philosophy.
In the decades prior to 1969, when George Mills Harper and Katherine
Raine began exploring Yeats’s extant occult papers, it was generally assumed
that these mystical interests could be separated from his literary works.27 This
longstanding critical consensus now appears rather extraordinary, especially in
light of the fact that Yeats openly acknowledged the abiding relevance of these
occult interests in his 1921 preface to Michael Robartes and the Dancer:
Goethe has said that the poet needs all philosophy, but that he must keep it
out of his work. After the first few poems I came into possession of Michael
Robartes’ exposition of the Speculum Angelorum et Hominum of Giraldus,
and in the excitement of arranging and editing could no more keep out
philosophy than could Goethe himself at certain periods of his life. (VP 853)

Yeats is referring to the “philosophy” that was subsequently published in the
1925 edition of A Vision, in which he claimed to have gleaned these insights
from a mysterious “Arabian traveller.”28 In the heavily revised 1937 edition,
Yeats provides an alternative account of this philosophy’s origins:
On the afternoon of October 24th 1917, four days after my marriage, my
wife surprised me by attempting automatic writing. What came in disjointed
sentences, in almost illegible writing, was so exciting, sometimes so profound,
that I persuaded her to give an hour or two day after day to the unknown
writer, and after some half-dozen such hours offered to spend what remained
of my life explaining and piecing together those sentences.29

Yeats maintained that these ethereal entities chose to communicate using the
terminology and themes that featured in his earlier occult exposition, Per
Amica Silentia Lunae (1917), and that this accounts for the similarity of these
two texts. Regardless of whether or not one finds this proposition credible, the
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system that appears in A Vision represents the culmination of Yeats’s lifelong
interest in all things phantasmagorical.
These occult interests were initially sparked by his relatives and their
servants at the Pollexfen family home at Merville in County Sligo, who were
unified by their infatuation with the paranormal, despite their disparate social
backgrounds (Life1 20–21). By the time he reached his early twenties, Yeats’s
interest in the supernatural had broadened to encompass strands of Eastern
mysticism, which he first encountered in A. P. Sinnet’s The Occult World
(1881) and Esoteric Buddhism (1883).30 Shortly after receiving a copy of the
latter text in late 1884 from his aunt, Isabella Pollexfen Varley, Yeats discovered
the Dublin Hermetic Society. Popular among many important figures in the
Irish intelligentsia, such as AE (George Russell), Eglinton, Charles Johnston,
Charles Weekes, and Claude Falls Wright, as well as scholars of Eastern
philosophy such as Mir Alaud Ali, Professor of Persian, Arabic, and Hindustani
at Trinity College Dublin, the Society provided a space for the exchange of
ideas derived from Eastern schools of thought (Life 1 46-47). In April 1886, the
Dublin Hermetic Society became the Dublin Theosophical Society, that is, an
official branch of the Theosophy movement co-founded by Helena Blavatsky
in 1875. After moving back to London in 1887, Yeats became a member of
Blavatsky’s London Lodge, also known as the “Blavatsky Lodge,” before joining
the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn in 1890.31 Where the quasi-religious
Theosophy movement drew inspiration from a heady mixture of Neoplatonism,
Buddhism, and Hinduism, the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn was a
secret society dedicated to the study and performance of magic and occult
practices. Yeats also discovered various modes of spiritualism while living in
London, such as the automatic writing that would later give rise to A Vision.32
To add to this already potent and eclectic range of occult influences, one might
also point to Yeats’s familiarity with Rosicrucianism, Cabbalism, Gnosticism,
alchemy, astrology, and the Tarot, to say nothing of his interest in the Western
mysticism of Emanuel Swedenborg, Jakob Böhme, and William Blake.33
Between 1925 and 1937, while Yeats immersed himself in a range of Eastern
beliefs and practices, he also familiarized himself with the work of Giambattista
Vico, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Oswald Spengler.34 Indeed, Yeats acknowledges
the many similarities between his and Spengler’s historical metanarratives
in the preface to the 1937 edition of A Vision. He does, nonetheless, contend
that his paranormal communicators shared this “symbolical map of history”
with him before the 1918 publication of Spengler’s The Decline of the West.35
The section titled “Dove and Swan,” in which Yeats sets out this historical
metanarrative, was one of only two sections that were republished more or less
untouched in the second edition. This is not really surprising, however, as Yeats
would have found little in these Eastern schools of thought, or in the works of

The Falconer is Dead

62

Vico, Schopenhauer, and Spengler, to have prompted a reconsideration of this
historical determinism.
In addition to appearing in Michael Robartes and the Dancer,36 the
collection in which Yeats underscored the significance of the philosophy that
bolsters this historical model, the esoteric discourse of A Vision makes its
presence felt from the outset of “The Second Coming”: “Turning and turning
in the widening gyre / The falcon cannot hear the falconer; / Things fall apart;
the centre cannot hold” (VP 401: 1–3). In the context of A Vision, Yeats uses
the term “gyre” to denote the two interpenetrating cones that form the nucleus
of his elaborate amalgamation of various strands in Western mysticism. For
example, he acknowledges the correlations between his gyres and Swedenborg’s
contention that “all physical reality, the universe as a whole, every solar system,
every atom, is a double cone.”37 Yeats draws additional inspiration from Blake’s
The Marriage of Heaven and Hell (1790), which was principally conceived as a
riposte to Swedenborg’s Heaven and Hell (1758). Blake challenged Swedenborg’s
steadfast adherence to the primacy of orthodox moral structures, and indeed
the mutual exclusivity of perceived opposites. Instead, Blake proposes that
conflictual forces are “necessary to human existence.”38 This Blakean influence
makes itself most keenly felt as Yeats assigns the qualities of “Concord” and
“Discord” to each of his gyres.
Even at this most basic level, the principles that underpin Yeats’s design
are incompatible with Nietzsche’s philosophical values. Writing on the
potential value of “mystical knowledge,” Nietzsche plainly stipulates that such
“explanations are thought to be deep; the truth is they are not even shallow.”39
There may be certain parallels between Nietzsche’s Apollonian and Dionysian
energies and the Blakean contraries that Yeats associates with his concordant
and discordant gyres.40 As Charles I. Armstrong has noted, these parallels are
likely attributable to Yeats’s and Nietzsche’s familiarity with the pre-Socratic
philosophies of Heraclitus and Empedocles, both of whom placed great
emphasis on the metaphysical significance of contraries.41 However, Nietzsche
would have objected most strenuously to Yeats’s somewhat Hegelian attempt to
systematize these conflictual energies into what he called a “logical form.”42 The
structural arrangement of this logical symbiosis is also at odds with Nietzsche’s
philosophy insofar as it designates the concordant gyre as “primary” and its
discordant opposite as “antithetical.” As Yeats puts it:
the subjective cone is called that of the antithetical tincture because it is achieved
and defended by continual conflict with its opposite; the objective cone is called
that of the primary tincture because whereas subjectivity [. . .] tends to separate
man from man, objectivity brings us back to the mass where we begin.43
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This idea that an individual might begin their journey on the “primary” side
of Yeats’s schema and eventually return there having traversed the antithetical
terrain of the opposing gyre implies that the subject’s natural position is akin
to that which Nietzsche repeatedly renounces as herd mentality. In spite of
these fundamental incongruities, it has long been believed that Yeats’s occult
speculation in A Vision is compatible with Nietzschean eternal recurrence.
For instance, Bridgewater has proposed that Yeats was attracted by “the many
parallels between Nietzsche’s work and the occult literature with which he
was already familiar.”44 Bohlmann stretches the point further by claiming that
“many of the premises” which underpin this “intricate system [. . .] clearly
find much precedent in Nietzsche, who lends immediacy to ancient notions.”45
Notwithstanding Harrison’s rejection of the perceived affiliations between
Yeats’s and Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence, these misapprehensions concerning
the similarities between Yeats’s occultism and Nietzsche’s philosophy have
stood unchallenged for over thirty-five years.
Although Bridgewater and Bohlmann do acknowledge that Yeats’s system
is more elaborate than the cosmological version of eternal recurrence which
they attribute to Nietzsche, they do not consider how these elaborations render
this system at odds with Nietzsche’s philosophical principles. This is especially
true of Yeats’s reliance on Böhmean mysticism. Yeats’s deployment of the
term “tincture” alerts us to the influence of Böhme, for whom it designates a
miraculous, life-giving energy that facilitates all growth and transformation.46
It is ultimately this miraculous energy that transforms Swedenborg’s “double
cone” into a spiralling double vortex of perpetual motion that facilitates growth
and transformation within the contrasting parameters set by Blake’s intimately
related contraries. With regard to “The Second Coming,” it is Böhme’s tincture
that keeps the Yeatsian gyres “turning and turning” (VP 401: 1). However,
Nietzsche was characteristically firm in his insistence that “the believer in
magic and miracles reflects on how to impose a law on nature–: and, in brief,
the religious cult is the outcome of this reflection.”47 Indeed, he was equally
forthright in his dismissal of astrological practices and the foolish pride of
those who believe “the starry firmament revolves around the fate of man.”48
And yet, Yeats further complicates this amalgamation of Western mysticism
by setting “a row of numbers upon the sides,” denoting “a classification [. . .] of
every possible movement of thought and life, [which] correspond to the phases
of the moon.”49 Yeats called this metaphysical construct the “Great Wheel” and
proposed that every individual is preordained to pass through these twentyeight stages of incarnation. As Ellmann explains:
the soul may be said to pass through all the phases within a single lifetime,
beginning with the completely unindividualized or objective state of infancy
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and sinking back at last into childhood and mere oblivion (phase 28), where it
dies and then after a period begins the round once more.50
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This suggests that each individual is effectively manoeuvred through these
twenty-eight phases of incarnation, ensuring that all their lived experiences
correspond to a process that sees them pass from the primary, objective
state, through the antithetical, subjective state, and ultimately returned to the
primary, objective state, where the cycle begins anew.
Critics who separate “The Second Coming” from the philosophical
backdrop set out in A Vision have tended to interpret the poem as a relatively
straightforward meditation upon the oscillating socio-political climate of
interwar Europe. Certainly, the poem “responds to and participates in the
pan-European militarization of politics that put an end to nineteenth-century
liberalism,” as Seamus Deane suggests.51 This reading is borne out by the topical
allusions that feature in the early drafts. As Helen Vendler has observed, these
include references to the French and Russian revolutions, and possibly the
militant unrest in early twentieth-century Ireland.52 However, the specificity of
Yeats’s “response,” and the precise nature of this “participation,” comes far more
sharply into focus when the poem is set against this philosophical backdrop.
The significance of this backdrop is underscored by the disparate interpretations
of the poem’s “falcon” metaphor advanced by Ellmann and Denis Donoghue.
The former argues that Yeats “was careful not to require knowledge of his
prose [and] made it possible to suppose that the gyre is merely the falcon’s
flight.”53 Donoghue cautions against discounting the importance of A Vision,
however, noting that such readings tend to pay disproportionate attention to
the poem’s socio-political context and reductively translate “the falconry into
specifically political terms.”54 The key difference is that Ellmann perceives the
“falcon’s flight” as being emblematic of Yeats’s gyres; whereas Donoghue rightly
points out that these gyres are signified by the act of “falconry.” This distinction
is not insignificant, nor is it a simple matter of semantics. These contrasting
interpretations point toward the time-honored philosophical question of free
will versus determinism. By Ellmann’s estimation, the falcon remains in control
of its own destiny as the gyre is generated by the falcon’s flight. But when the act
of falconry is associated with the image of the gyre, as Donoghue suggests, it
operates as a powerful metaphor of humankind’s unawareness of the ordinance
this casual configuration exerts. Hence, “the falcon cannot hear the falconer”
(VP 401:2). Falcons are renowned for their flight speed and capacity to rapidly
shift direction. And yet, these majestic birds are routinely trained to hunt upon
command. From the vantage point of A Vision, the relationship that binds the
unknowing human subject to the ordinance of the Great Wheel shares a great
deal with the affiliation that binds the falcon to its falconer.
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Donoghue’s clarification becomes all the more significant when the
implications of Yeats’s philosophical conjecture are considered, not only at the
microcosmic level that relates to every individual’s lived experience, but also at
the macrocosmic level that applies this cyclical process to the collective history
and cumulative fate of all humankind. This is the “symbolical map of history”
that Yeats republished largely without revision in the 1937 edition of A Vision.55
He calls this macrocosmic version of the Great Wheel the “Historical Cones.”
This construct implies that all of humankind’s known history is nothing more
than a carefully choreographed and repetitive oscillation between these primary
and antithetical gyres. Like some prodigious square dance, doomed to eternally
repeat itself, these macrocosmic cycles, or “Great Years,” are directed by the
same amalgamation of mystical and astrological principles that comprise the
Great Wheel. As Matthew Gibson explains, the term “Great Year” was used by
both Neoplatonists and Stoics to describe a “continuum in history, computed to
be either 36,000 or around 26,000 years long, [. . .] involving the alignment and
return of the planets to the same point.”56 Whatever about the overall length of
this astrological cycle, Yeats notes that the two thousand years of Christianity
is “an entire wheel,” much “like the two thousand years [. . .] that went before
it.”57 The apocalyptic imagery described in “The Second Coming” bears witness
to the decline of the two-thousand-year Christian cycle. In fact, the “twenty
centuries of stony sleep” (19–22) described by the poem’s speaker corresponds
with Yeats’s contention that the “Christian era, like the two thousand years [. . .]
that went before it, is an entire wheel.”58 If one follows Ellmann’s lead, assuming
that the falcon’s flight is emblematic of the turning gyre, it seems reasonable to
conclude that the contemporaneous collapse of European order is manifested
in the falcon’s apparent incapacity to heed the falconer’s directives. When set
against the historical metanarrative constructed in A Vision, however, this
collapse appears entirely analogous with the necessary chaos that is ushered in
with the dawning of the antithetical era. From this perspective, chaos does not
reign supreme in “The Second Coming” because “the falcon cannot hear the
falconer” (VP 401:2). This phrase instead refers to humankind’s obliviousness
to the fact that this chaos has been predestined to occur as the concord initiated
by the primary gyre gives way to its antithetical opposite. As the speaker
succinctly puts it, “things fall apart; the centre cannot hold” (VP 401:3).
While acknowledging that “Yeats himself liked to talk as if it made
everything predestined,” Ellmann argues against a fatalistic reading of Yeats’s
design and insists that one may still “choose between several alternatives.”59
In theory, this might be true of the microcosmic existential level that Yeats
associates with his Great Wheel. However, this non-fatalist reading simply
cannot function at the macrocosmic historical level that Yeats associates with
the Great Years. Should one possess the capacity to make meaningful life
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choices, as Ellmann proposes, these choices would invariably, by their very
definition, possess the capacity to alter the uniformity that Yeats ascribes to
the recurring historical cycles that comprise the Great Year. If, for example,
a substantial mass of subjects freely chose to adhere to “primary” principles
during an “antithetical” age, could it still be characterized by the values Yeats
associates with the antithetical gyre? Indeed, it was the matter of the system’s
fatalism that elicited the strongest criticism from Yeats’s friend, George
Russell (AE):
I feel to follow in the wake of Mr. Yeats’s mind is to surrender oneself to the
idea of Fate and to part from the idea of Free Will. I know how much our life
is fated once life animates the original cell, the fountain from which the body
is jetted; how much bodily conditions affect or even determine our thought,
but I still believe in Free Will and that, to use the language of the astrologers,
it is always possible for a man to rise above his stars. Now Mr. Yeats would
have me believe that a great wheel turns ceaselessly, and that I and all others
drop into inevitable groove after groove. It matters not my virtue to-day, my
talent which I burnish, the wheel will move me to another groove where I am
predestined to look on life as that new spiritual circumstance determines, and
my will is only free to accept or rebel, but not to alter what is fated.60

We would do well to take Russell’s misgivings under advisement; he was
certainly no stranger to the occult circles in which Yeats moved.61 More than
this, however, the determinism that he identifies at the nucleus of Yeats’s
metaphysical configuration appears to permeate the form and meaning of
“The Second Coming.”
For all its descriptions of the impending terror that will arise in conjunction
with the dawning of the antithetical age, there is little variation from the
decasyllabic metre established in the poem’s opening lines. In fact, where there
is a slight deviation in the first stanza from the iambic pentameter that features
predominantly throughout, this deviation is specifically contrived to establish a
certain parallelism between the poem’s form and content. The initial foot in the
poem’s opening line, “Turning,” is a trochaic inversion of the dominant pattern
in the lines that follow. As a consequence, the textual form works in tandem
with the “Turning” it describes (VP 401:1). This structured uniformity persists
even while the speaker insists that “things fall apart; the centre cannot hold”
(VP 401:3). In this instance, the semicolon fuses two separate, yet closely related
clauses using a strict iambic pentameter that flouts the line’s expressed meaning.
This forges an alliance that is, within the context of the poem, as symmetrical
as it is disruptive because this dissolution of order and descent into chaos is
not in itself chaotic. The poem’s formal structure never relinquishes its power
over the content; it coaxes stealthily and from a distance, much as the causal
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configuration represented by Yeats’s falconry looms ever constrictively and yet
beyond the comprehension of his falcon. This decasyllabic pattern is sustained
throughout the five lines that complete the first stanza, where the speaker’s
cool and detached register further infuses these apocalyptic descriptions with
a certain sense of inevitability: “Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, / The
blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere / The ceremony of innocence is
drowned; / The best lack all conviction, while the worst / Are full of passionate
intensity” (VP 401:4–8). It is also telling that the spondaic feet at the beginning
of line four stresses that it is “mere anarchy” that “is loosed upon the world.”
Indeed, this anarchy is “mere” precisely because this dissolution of order is
an entirely natural and preordained by-product of Yeats’s antithetical age. In
addition to the quartet of slant rhymes that lend the first four lines of this octave
a loose sense of stability, “gyre,” “falconer,” “world,” and “hold” (VP 401:1–4),
Vendler notes that this first stanza is “constructed in a series of half-lines,
separated by medial breaks, in which the ‘left’ half represents the dissolution of
form, and the ‘right’ half represents the threatened world order”:
Chaos					
Order
Turning and turning				
in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear			
the falconer
Things fall apart				
the centre cannot hold
Mere anarchy is loosed			
upon the world
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed		
and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned
						The best
lack all conviction, while
The worst are full of passionate intensity.62

Even the violent, oceanic imagery that Yeats uses in this stanza implies the
presence of some underlying gravitational force; a force strong enough to
orchestrate and conduct this ostensibly spontaneous implosion.
As Deane proposes, it is possible to determine “what the falcon, the tide,
the ceremony, the best, [and] the worst” refer to from the surrounding poems
in Michael Robartes and the Dancer.63 Nevertheless, the meanings ascribed to
these poetic components take on greater significance if one is familiar with
the version of eternal recurrence that Yeats outlines in A Vision. The second
and final stanza of the “The Second Coming” also exploits the radical sense of
oscillation that characterizes this mode of historical determinism. Drawing on
the intertextuality set up by the poem’s title, which evokes the day of judgement
traditionally associated with the return of Jesus Christ, this stanza imbues the
“rocking cradle” and the town of “Bethlehem” with all the ungodly menace
that Yeats ascribes to his antithetical age. This is not “the glorious Second
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Coming of Christ,” as Vendler succinctly puts it, “but a reprise, in grotesque
form, of a new energy at Bethlehem.”64 Deane has rightly observed that this
poem engages with the contrasting themes of “ending” and “beginning” in a
way that problematizes the distinction between the two.65 But the origin of
this difficulty is twofold. On the one hand, it arises because the poem’s speaker
refuses to draw a value-based distinction between the contrasting principles
that will reign supreme in the disparate historical cycles that clash in Yeats’s
text. On the other hand, it remains elusive because, for Yeats, these cycles are
just equivalent constituents of an all-encompassing whole. Much like the first
stanza, the poem’s second stanza adheres to a certain formal consistency; in
fact, its fourteen decasyllabic lines comprise a variation on the traditional
sonnet, composed in a predominantly blank verse, that parallels the carefully
controlled chaos of the first stanza. In this way, the formal synchronicity that
underpins the apocalyptic imagery conjured up in this second stanza further
mirrors the underlying causal force that orchestrates the fate of humankind in
accordance with Yeats’s historical metanarrative.
It is certainly true that Yeats’s “shape with lion body and the head of a
man, / A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun” (VP 401:14–15) is reminiscent of
Nietzsche’s “blond beast.” As Patrick Bixby explains, this creaturely signifier is
“associated with everything from the dauntless heroes of ancient Greek culture
to the predatory instincts of the lion” across the breadth of Nietzsche’s writing.66
However, the determinist iteration of eternal recurrence that underpins the
historical metanarrative that Yeats communicates in A Vision, and makes its
present felt at the levels of form and content in “The Second Coming,” does
not align with the axiological reformulation of eternal recurrence that modern
and contemporary scholars associate with Nietzsche. Notwithstanding the
ostensible similarities between Nietzsche’s Apollonian and Dionysian energies
and the Blakean contraries that feature in Yeats’s cyclical design, it is difficult
to substantiate Bridgewater’s and Bohlmann’s contention that there are many
parallels between Nietzsche’s philosophy and Yeats’s middle-period occultism.
If indeed there are correlations between Nietzsche’s philosophy and Yeats’s
occult speculation in A Vision, they are akin to those described by Harold
Bloom as “misprision,” insofar as Yeats misreads Nietzsche “to clear and
imaginative space” for himself.67
In addition to the incompatibilities previously noted, it is difficult to
reconcile this occult speculation with one of Nietzsche’s most basic and
immediately recognisable philosophical principles, “God is dead.” This
proclamation of God’s death does not only reject all monotheistic claims to
absolute authority; it rejects all claims to absolute authority, whether they are
made in the name of religion, science, morality, politics, or quasi-religious
occult speculation. In his 1873 essay, “David Strauss, the Confessor and
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Writer,” Nietzsche admonished those who wished to inscribe a “new faith” by
“constructing the broad universal highway of the future”; in fact, he equated
such efforts equated to those of a “trundling hippopotamus” whose “growling
and barking had changed into the proud accents of the founder of a religion.”68
Just one year later, in an essay entitled “On the Uses and Disadvantages of
History for Life,” Nietzsche warns that the individual who learns:
to bend his back and bow his head before the “power of history” at last nods
“Yes” like a Chinese mechanical doll to every power, whether it be government
or public opinion or a numerical majority, and moves his limbs to the precise
rhythm at which any “power” whatever pulls the strings.69

By the time Nietzsche published Human All Too Human in 1878, he had already
rejected the ascetic determinism espoused by his one-time mentor, Arthur
Schopenhauer, and concluded that one “must remove the motley leopardskin” of Schopenhauerian metaphysics “if one is to discover the real moralist
genius behind it.”70 All of these remarks appeared in Nietzsche’s writing before
he proclaims God’s death for the first time in The Gay Science (1882), in which
he further cautions that “there may still for millennia be caves in which they
show [God’s] shadow. – And we – we must still defeat his shadow as well.”71 It
is not simply that eternal recurrence holds a different significance for Yeats and
Nietzsche, as Harrison observes in his analysis of “The Second Coming.” The
version of eternal recurrence that makes its presence felt in this poem stands
in diametrical opposition to the life-affirming potential that Nietzsche wishes
to unlock with all these denunciations of claims to absolute authority. Indeed,
for Nietzsche, even the shadow of God-like omnipotence that manifests in the
form of Yeats’s falconer is dead.
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